Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, government regulators have become more interested than ever in the significant increase of bank size in the U.S. financial sector. To shed light on the reasons of the bank size increase and its effects on banks, we study the dynamic interactions between size, cost efficiency and returns to scale. Using Fourier flexible form, we show that banks of all but the largest sizes exhibit increasing returns to scale. As banks grow, they tend to benefit from cost efficiencies more, but they lose returns to scale gains. Banks seem to exploit increasing returns to scale until they become too large; however, they continue to enjoy their cost efficiency. We also analyze the effects of regulations in the past 25 years to understand whether imposing (or removing) limits on the size of banks causes real economic costs. Our findings show that both restrictive and loose regulations help larger banks but hurt smaller banks by creating extra costs.
Introduction
The past 25 years have been characterized by heavy regulations (and deregulations) as well as significant increases in bank size. Assets of the five largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets increased from 23 percent in 1996 to about 48 percent in 2014. 1 In this paper, we investigate the reasons and the effects of the bank size increase, by analyzing economies of scale and cost efficiency throughout the banking industry. We further study the economic costs of the regulatory environments in the past 25 years on differently sized banks.
Two of the most important reasons why banks are growing are returns to scale and cost efficiency gains. Although the earlier literature has mixed results on scale economies, recent literature has found increasing returns to scale for most banks. Using Fourier flexible form model, we first show that all but the largest banks exhibit increasing returns to scale. Then we demonstrate that an increase in total assets leads to an increase in cost efficiency but a decrease in returns to scale.
Banks seem to exploit increasing returns to scale until they become too large;
1 Data are obtained from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), The World Bank.
2 Schweitzer (1972) , Noulas et al. (1990) and Hunter et al. (1990) find increasing returns to scale for all but the largest banks, which exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Similarly, McAllister and McManus (1993) and Wheelock and Wilson (2001) find increasing returns to scale for most banks but constant returns to scale for the largest banks. however, they continue to benefit from cost efficiency gains.
The regulatory environment might also play an important role in the observed size increase of the banking sector. For example, regulations that gave more freedom to bank holding companies (such as Gramm-Leach-Bliley) likely resulted in cost synergies through an increase in merger activity, particularly for larger banks. Dodd-Frank, which is more restrictive, may have helped the banks by reducing the risk, but it may also have imposed costs on banks. To more effectively address whether bank size alters the costs arising from regulations, we use the cost decomposition data from the largest 198 commercial bank holding companies and account for each pertinent regulatory period. We find that both restrictive and loose regulations tend to benefit larger banks but hurt smaller banks.
Bank Regulations and Their Effects on Costs and Returns to Scale
The literature on the effects of regulations on bank costs is extensive, but many papers focus either on a country's general policies at a given point in time (such as Barth et al. (2004) ) or focus on earlier regulatory periods (such as DemirgucKunt and Detragiache (2002)). These discussions help reinforce the connection between returns to scale and regulation; however, they provide little in helping to formulate expectations for how returns to scale and costs respond specifically to more recent regulatory periods in the United States. By focusing on the three banking regulations over the past 25 years, we can pinpoint the precise regulatory environment that affects returns to scale and bank costs. The following sections give details on these specific regulations and provide evidence on how they could affect bank costs and scale economies.
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching

Efficiency Act
The Riegle-Neal Act was passed in 1994 and is still in effect today. In September 1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Act, allowing bank holding companies to acquire banks across state lines regardless of individual state laws (this provision became active on September 30, 1995). In addition, on June 1, 1997, the bill permitted interstate mergers of pre-existing banks. Act. The authors conclude that increases in short-term profitability were higher in mergers that occurred in the period after Riegle-Neal was enacted due to cost synergies from consolidating operations.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted on November 12, 1999, with the intention of repealing the Glass-Steagall Act. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allowed banks to maintain both investment and commercial banking divisions. Chronopoulous Act on bank costs. They argue that bank costs would be reduced, primarily from the cost synergies associated with combining investment and commercial banking facilities. For example, a commercial bank could leverage its current telecommunications and data processing divisions to include the sales of insurance and securities for low additional costs.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010, and is still in effect today. The Dodd-Frank was signed following the worst recessionary period in the recent U.S. history. This recession was spurred, in part, by loose regulations governing financial institutions' securitization businesses. Over 2,000 pages long, Dodd-Frank reform aims to limit the risks that banks take and helps minimize the severe results from bank failures. 3 We use the rankings before the Great Recession to account for the banks that did not survive after the turmoil. 4 Please refer to Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the dataset.
made up the large group, between $500 million and $2.5 billion made up the medium group, and under $500 million made up the smallest bank category. Tables   4 through 7 To assess the range of cost efficiency over time and across bank groups of different sizes, Figure 2 plots the average value of total noninterest expenses divided by total assets for the 1992:3 to 2014:2 period. 5 Interestingly, small and medium commercial bank holding companies appear to become more cost efficient over time, whereas the TBTF and large commercial bank holding companies experienced declines in their cost efficiency since mid 1990s. This analysis shows that there is some heterogeneity among banks in terms of cost efficiency gains. 5 It is important to note that total noninterest expenses divided by assets is a measure of cost inefficiency. Throughout the paper, lower values always denote higher cost efficiency. is not feasible. A finite Fourier series, however, is semi-nonparametric and (unlike, for instance, the Translog cost function) is a global approximation of the cost function. 6 The Fourier flexible form used in this paper is presented below:
Where C is total costs, Q is the vector of outputs, p is the vector presenting input prices, k i is a vector of integer values and V is a vector of the logged input and output quantities and A t is the vector containing macroeconomic controls as well as bank regulation dummy variables. 7 Lastly, u i is a vector of bank-fixed effects. In the case of bank holding companies, a firm's total loans will serve as a measure of a bank's output. The inputs for a firm's production function are labor, capital, and deposits. The amount of labor is specified by the sum of employee benefits and personnel costs. The amount of capital is a sum of the supplies and printing, software, occupancy, and equipment expenses.
In order for the Fourier flexible form to accurately measure returns to scale, several criteria must be fulfilled. In particular, the input and output variables must be transformed so that they vary within the interval [0,2π]. In terms of choosing k i , there is no substantial literature on it; however, we follow the criteria laid out in Skolrud (2013) and use a 6fh order Fouries series expansion. To ensure orthogonality between the cosine and sine terms, all values within the k i vectors must be integers. In order to maintain linear homogeneity, the sum of all the β m coefficients must be 1. Put simply, this restriction ensures that, should each operating cost be multiplied by some scalar constant, the total cost will change by the same constant. In other words: λC = C(Q, λp); the cost function must 6 We also analyzed returns to scale of banks using Translog cost function. Both Translog and Fourier provide similar conclusions. Translog cost function results are available upon request. 7 Note that the dummy variables take the value of zero before a regulation was enacted and one in all periods thereafter. be homogeneous of degree one. From the arguments of linear homogeneity and symmetry, it follows that the τ and δ coefficients must also sum to zero. The addition of the vector V means restrictions must also be imposed on the values of k i . In particular, the sum of k i integers, which are multiplied with input prices, must equal zero. This restriction ensures that λC = C(Q, λp) is still satisfied when using the Fourier flexible form.
Returns to scale measures can be obtained from the Fourier flexible form by taking a partial derivative with respect to the natural log of output:
This partial derivative gives the change in cost resulting from an increase or decrease in output. If this number is one, then cost is perfectly correlated with output and commercial bank holding companies exhibit constant returns to scale.
Along the same argument, a value higher than one yields decreasing returns to scale, and less than one yields increasing returns to scale.
Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR)
VAR, or vector autoregressive models, are those that project a given variable's current value as a function of its lagged values and lagged values of other variables.
VAR models are particularly useful because all input variables are treated as endogenously determined and interdependent. With purely time-series data, the general equation for a vector autoregressive model can be written as
Where X t is an (nx1) vector of endogenous variables at some time t. The vectors on the right-hand side of the equation represent lagged values of the (nx1) vector. The Γ's represent (nxn) coefficient matrices and the term is an i.i.d.
(nx1) vector of error terms. The number of lags is equal to m, the value of which we determine by Akaike and Schwartz information criteria. Written in a more accessible format below is an example of an n-variable, two-lag vector autoregression:
. .
. . .
It is straightforward to see that the above equation can be extrapolated to any number of lags given the addition of more matrices. Presented thus far have only been vector autoregressions for use with times series data. Given that our data consist of 198 commercial bank holding companies across 24 years, we must extrapolate our time series model to work with a panel dataset. The econometric application of a PVAR model is slightly more complicated, but the theoretical extension to a panel dataset can be written compactly as
For our purposes, the most useful information from the PVAR comes in the form of impulse response functions. Impulse response functions measure the responses of current and future values of each variable to a shock, defined as a unit increase in the current value of one of the variables. For our VAR model, the shock will be a change in row n of the (nx1) column vector. Because of the interpendencies that characterize a PVAR, this shock will likely affect all variables in X t . The response over time of the X t variables creates the impulse response functions. In general, the n shock imposed is the size of the standard deviation of variable x n . In addition, all variables are typically normalized to have a value equal to zero prior to the shock.
For commercial bank holding companies, PVAR is particularly interesting because the parameters that characterize an impulse response function will show the effects that an increase in assets have on cost efficiency and returns to scale.
Bayesian Panel VAR
All forms of regression analysis contain bias based on a researcher's prior beliefs.
In order to develop a strong model, the researcher will select variables and, in some In Bayesian analysis, the posterior has two components: a likelihood function, which contains information about the parameters from observed data, and a prior, which contains information about the parameters from other sources. The posterior distribution generally cannot be solved for analytically, as it typically does not have a closed-form solution. Thus, to find the posterior solution one must use Markow Chain Monte Carlo sampling to approximate the distribution. Despite the differences in their theoretical basis, the form of the Bayesian PVAR is equivalent to that of Equation (5) used in PVAR, the only difference being the additional reliance on priors and the determination of a solution through estimation.
Results
Measurements of Returns to Scale
First, we use the Fourier flexible form to determine the returns to scale for each banks size group. The estimates of ∂ ln C/∂ ln Q are presented in Table 1 . Notes: RTS higher than one yields decreasing returns to scale, and less than one yields increasing returns to scale. Table 1 shows that the largest commercial bank holding companies in our study exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Our results are consistent with the previous research which find increasing returns to scale up to a particular size limit. Although each size category exhibits increasing returns to scale, the medium commercial bank holding companies exhibit the largest returns to scale compared to large and small commercial bank holding companies showing a non-monotonic distribution of returns to scale. Next, we turn to assessing the role that the banking regulations play in total costs banks incur. Interestingly, we find that the total costs of small commercial bank holding companies increased significantly as a result of Dodd-Frank legislation. This result is surprising because the Dodd-Frank legislation was marketed as a way to reduce banking risk, specifically for the largest U.S¿ commercial bank holding companies. Although the coefficients are insignificant, the total costs for TBTF has increased as expected, yet it decreased for large and medium commercial bank holding companies after the Dodd-Frank. The largest commercial bank holding companies (TBTF and large) benefited the most from legislation that granted commercial bank holding companies more freedom (Riegle-Neal and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) while smaller bank holding companies hurt most in terms of cost increases. We can conclude that restrictive bank regulations, even those which are targeted towards the largest commercial bank holding companies, have the most significant negative effect on the smallest commercial bank holding companies. Because we use a panel dataset, we address the issues relating to bank fixed effects by using Helmert transformation. The use of vector autoregressive models in returns to scale and bank cost efficiency research is novel, and it represents our contribution to the field. 
Panel VAR (PVAR) Results
PVAR
Bayesian Panel VAR Results
We obtain posterior distributions for the Bayesian PVAR using Metropolis-Hastings MCMC sampling. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm requires initial prior distributions for each coefficient in the Bayesian PVAR. The posterior distribution of these coefficients is then updated through a series of iterations. 8 To deal with the issue of bank fixed effects, we again apply a Helmert transformation to each of the variables used. The conclusions drawn from the Bayesian PVAR impulse responses are consistent with those of the PVAR IRFs. An increase in total assets increases cost efficiency while decreasing returns to scale. 8 The posterior distribution was based on 1 million MCMC iterations (of which the first 500,000 were discarded). As few as 100,000 iterations were also tested, and in all cases (with iterations between 1,000,000 and 100,000) all convergence criteria were met.
9 Please refer to A.2 for the prior and posterior coefficient distributions for each of the nine variables included in the Bayesian PVAR.
Robustness Checks
First, we test our findings using a balanced panel dataset for the period of 1998:1 to 2014:2 to understand whether the unbalanced nature of the dataset affects the results. We find that returns to scale and PVAR results are very similar under a balanced dataset as seen in Figure 5 . This analysis shows that failed banks in our period do not seem to skew our findings. As was previously mentioned, once banks are placed in a given size category, they do not leave that group regardless of whether they grow larger or smaller over time. Using bank average real assets, we establish groups which banks could enter or leave across time. Allowing banks to change groups does not change the main conclusions of the paper.
Recognizing that our results could be influenced by the controls that we select, we run both the PVAR with and without macroeconomic controls as can be seen in Figure 7 . The conclusions drawn from running the PVAR without controls are the same as when the PVAR was run with controls.
While our model is based on the most conservative ordering, we changed the Cholesky ordering in our PVAR estimation to account for ordering effects. 10 We note that the model is robust to ordering: a change in the variable order has no significant effects on the IRFs.
Conclusion
In this paper we try to understand the underlying reasons why banks have been growing larger for 25 years. In particular, we ask the following two questions: If a bank grows larger in size, would it benefit from scale economies and/or cost efficiency gains? Do dissimilar regulatory environments affect banks differently by lessening (or increasing) costs which could in turn encourage (or discourage)
banks to grow? To answer these questions, we study the effects of an increase in bank size on returns to scale and cost efficiency gains.
Knowing that banks are heterogeneous, we first divide our dataset into four we use in this paper are shown in Table 3 .
Many of the bank holding companies in our dataset contain several quarters where data is unavailable for certain expenses. Often, missing data are a result of a company switching accounting procedures. If a missing quarter occurs between quarters containing data, the missing entry is replaced with an average of the quarters before and after the entry as long as the missing entries do not exceed three for the entire sample.
Since banks do not provide individual financial statements for their fourth-quarters, we obtained fourth quarter noninterest expenses by summing the three available quarters and subtracting the total from the similar cost presented in the annual reports. We paid special attention to matching the quarterly financial statements with annual statements for every bank and each year. When we fail to do so, we obtained missing fourth-quarter values by averaging the preceding third-quarter and following first-quarter values. If this adjustment is made for more than three years, however, we remove the bank from our dataset.
The cost decomposition data used in this paper are far more detailed than the reports that are regulated by the SEC. 11 Thus, sometimes, bank holding companies had slightly different methods of reporting their detailed financial information.
Two such categories that required the most careful analysis were the personnel and occupancy expenses. For personnel, some banks report only salaries paid (breaking employee benefits into a separate account), whereas other holding companies would report only one general category. Similarly, some companies choose to group their occupancy costs with their equipment costs. Because the personnel and occupancy data were the largest cost categories, we combined the equipment and occupancy into one category and personnel and employee benefits costs into another for each bank holding company in our dataset. 
A.1.2 Summary Statistics
Below are our tables showing the different summary statistics for TBTF, large, medium, and small commercial bank holding companies. Figure 7 : PVAR IRFs measuring cost efficiency and returns to scale after a total asset shock with the entire dataset, including macroeconomic controls.
